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SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE
that even if the exception applied, the alleged error in this case was
readily discoverable by the plaintiff or its new attorneys.9
Although a discovery rule for attorney malpractice would ap-
parently not have aided the plaintiff in Gilbert, it would promote fair-
ness in cases where there has been substantial delay before an attorney's
malpractice could reasonably have been discovered.' 0
ARTICLE 3 - JURISDICTION AND SERVICE,
APPEARANCE AND CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 316(c): Failure to publish summons within twenty-day statutory
period deemed a jurisdictional defect.
The CPLR, consistent with its policy of liberal construction," per-
mits the court to correct a mistake or irregularity at any stage of an ac-
tion provided that there is no substantial prejudice to the rights of op-
posing pardes.' 2 Although courts have differentiated curable irregu-
larities from incurable jurisdictional defects, no general standard has
emerged from this classification. 13
In Gaton v. Caton,14 the Supreme Court, Monroe County, ad-
dressed itself to the irregularity-jurisdictional defect dichotomy as it ap-
plied to service by publication of a summons in a divorce action.
Therein, the first publication was not made within twenty days after
the granting of the order of publication as required by CPLR 316(c). 15
In holding the defect to be jurisdictional and dismissing the complaint,
the court distinguished mere irregularities in service by publication 0
from jurisdictional defects in the manner or time of publication.1 7
9 40 App. Div. 2d at 104-05, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 373-74.
10 There is something profoundly distressing in the notion that a cause of action
may become time-barred even before the plaintiff knew or could, as a reasonable
man, have known about its existence. There may even be a due process question.
7B McKsNNEY'S CPLR 214, commentary at 437 (1972). Cf. Wilson v. Econom, 56 Misc. 2d
272, 288 N.Y.S.2d 381 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1968). But see Schwartz v. Heyden Newport
Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 218-19, 188 N.E.2d 142, 145, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, 719, cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963).
11 CPLR 104.
12 CPLR 2001.
13 Valz v. Sheepshead Bay Bungalow Corp., 249 N.Y. 122, 134, 163 N.E. 124, 128, cert.
denied, 278 U.S. 647 (1928).
14 72 Misc. 2d 544, 339 N.Y.S.2d 92 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1972).
15 Service was made by publication, but the first publication was three days late.
16 Lambert v. Lambert, 270 N.Y. 422, 1 N.E.2d 833 (1936) (failure to timely file the
order of publication is curable by a nunc pro tunc order); Winter v. Winter, 256 N.Y.
113, 175 N.E. 533 (1931) (failure to file proof of service before judgment is an irregularity);
Valz v. Sheepshead Bay Bungalow Corp., 249 N.Y. 122, 163 N.E. 124, cert. denied, 278
U.S. 647 (1928) (publication of summons in a newspaper different from the one named in
the order of publication may be cured by amendment of order nunc pro tunc); Mishkind-
Feinberg Realty Co. v. Sidorsky, 189 N.Y. 402, 82 NE. 448 (1907).
17 72 Misc. 2d at 545, 339 N.Y.S2d at 94, citing Doheny v. Worden, 75 App. Div. 47,
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The Caton decision is properly strict, especially in view of the in-
herent weakness of service by publication in giving notice to the defen-
dant of an impending action.'8
ARTICLE 6- JOINDER OF CLAIMS, CONSOLIDATION AND SEVERANCE
CPLR 602: Degree of responsibility attributable to each defendant for
similar injuries suffered by a plaintiff in separate automobile accidents
held to justify joint trial.
CPLR 602 bestows upon the courts broad discretionary power to
join the trials of separate actions, upon motion, when they involve "a
common question of law or fact."' 9 Thayer v. Collett20 illustrates the
application of this permissive standard.21 Therein, the Appellate Divi-
sion, Third Department, held that where a plaintiff had instituted sep-
arate actions to recover for similar injuries allegedly sustained in two
automobile accidents occurring a year apart, it was not an improper
exercise of discretion to grant the motion of one of the defendants for
a joint trial; The court found that the degree of responsibility attrib-
utable to each defendant for the alleged injuries constituted a common
question of fact, and that a determination of this question by a joint
trial would be fairer to both the plaintiff and the defendants since it
would prevent a litigating defendant from seeking to cast blame for the
injuries on the absent defendants. 22
This decision is sound. When, as in Thayer, a joint trial will serve
to preserve the rights of the parties, its use should be encouraged as an
effective means of expediting litigation and avoiding the inconsistent
verdicts that may result from a multiplicity of suits. 23
CPLR 602: Second Department recommends trial preference when
summary proceeding consolidated with action.
The CPLR appears to permit the consolidation of a plenary action
with a special proceeding,24 and a majority of New York courts have so
77 N.Y.S. 959 (4th Dep't 1902); Alfonso v. Alfonso, 99 Misc. 550, 165 N.Y.S. 1037 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1917).
18 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 US. 371, 382 (1971).
19 CPLR 602(a). See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 602, commentary at 116 (1963). See gener-
ally Boyea v. Lambeth, 33 App. Div. 2d 928, 306 N.YS.2d 481 (3d Dep't 1970) (mem.).
Note that CPLR 602 liberalizes the CPA requirement for joinder, i.e., that the actions
grow out of the same set of facts. Compare CPA 96-a and Abbatepaolo v. Blumberg, 7 App.
Div. 2d 847, 182 N.Y.S.2d 83 (2d Dep't 1959) (mem.), with CPLR 602(a) and Wyant v.
Jensen, 25 App. Div. 2d 388, 270 N.YS.2d 156 (3d Dep't 1966).
2041 App. Div. 2d 581, 340 N.Y.S.2d 16 (3d Dep't 1973) (mem.).
21 See Wyant v. Jensen, 25 App. Div. 2d 388, 270 N.Y.S.2d 156 (3d Dep't 1966); Potter v
Clark, 19 App. Div. 2d 585, 240 N.Y.S.2d 495 (4th Dep't 1963) (mem.). But see Kom v
Duhl, 22 App. Div. 2d 793, 253 N.Y.S.2d 874 (2d Dep't 1964) (mem.).
22 41 App. Div. 2d at 581, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
23 See 2 WK&M 602.01.
24 CPLR 602(a) provides for the consolidation of "actions" involving common questions
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